It may be laid down as a general rule, that [the people 's] confidence in and obedience to a government, will be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.
Publius (Alexander Hamilton) Federalist Paper #1

Introduction
To avoid fiscal insolvency while modernizing municipal operations to fit shrinking and changing population needs, Mayor George Voinovich and Mayor Frank Jackson of Cleveland have used public-private partnerships to tap into business, nonprofit, and community-based resources to secure a new and positive future for Clevelanders. Specifically, this article analyzes Mayor Voinovich's Operations Improvement Task Force (OITF) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) and Mayor Jackson's Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) from the inside out. Based on this inside-out approach, we show how and why the two mayoral-led public-private partnerships were indispensable to successful management of urban change and the renewal of good government in Cleveland.
Five Good Government Partnership Behaviors
Our analysis of the Voinovich OITF and the Jackson OETF partnerships is grounded in the network scholarship of Michael McGuire and Robert Agranoff. McGuire and Agranoff (2011, 266 ) define a public management network as one type of collaborative activity involving multiple organizations and multiple perspectives; these organizations join together to solve a major problem that a single entity cannot solve easily or by acting alone. However, public management networks are not panaceas because they have severe limitations, not the least of which is inertia. Therefore, McGuire & Agranoff encourage researchers to study how public management networks can be managed effectively to overcome inertia and deliver results. Accordingly, our study of the two mayoral-led public-private partnerships in Cleveland examines their inside operations in terms of four network management behaviors identified by McGuire and Agranoff (2014) -activating, mobilizing, framing, and synthesizing. Thus, our research question is as follows: Do the public-private partnerships of Cleveland Mayors Voinovich and Jackson aimed at operations improvement to avoid fiscal insolvency involve the behaviors of activating, mobilizing, framing, and synthesizing? Our research also reveals that the Cleveland mayors adopted a fifth network management behavior that we define as sustaining the public-private partnership results. Each management behavior is defined briefly in turn.
First, activation focuses on the mayor's leadership philosophy, and his partnership vision of operations improvement that require speedy action to address an urgent municipal fiscal situation. Activating behaviors also refer to the mayor's incorporation of key persons and stakeholders who take charge of organizing the governance of the public-private partnership.
3 Second, mobilization focuses on the mayor's leadership in cultivating the internal and external support for his public-private partnership vision of operations improvement. Thus, mobilization activities generate commitments for securing the information, financial, and human resources needed to operationalize the partnership. An essential aspect of mobilization is the identification of partnership champions and process leaders. Champions are those who sell the public-private partnership idea internally to department heads and city employees and to the external community, including funders, municipal unions, civic groups, elected officials, and county officials; process leaders are the vision keepers who are responsible for the day-to-day management of the public-private partnership.
Third, framing behaviors translate the partnership vision and the commitments for operations improvement into municipal policies and practices. Framing also focuses on building the capacity of partnership external volunteer participants and city employees through training and development. Furthermore, framing includes the establishment of an operations improvement coordinator responsible for monitoring the implementation of the change proposals emerging from the study phase of the partnership process. These framing activities incorporate the practices of professional management into a work culture of delivering excellent city service.
Fourth, synthesizing activities enhance the work conditions that lead to a collaborative environment and productive interactions among the internal and external partnership members.
In other words, through synthesis, the mayor and his partnership managers remove the obstacles and create opportunities for the participants to build relationships of trust so that they can focus on the achievement of results. In effect, synthesis behaviors develop a citywide orientation 4 among internal participants that culminate in the successful completion of the partnership's goals and objectives.
Fifth, sustaining behaviors integrate the public-private partnership's methodology of operations improvement into day-to-day municipal governance, resulting in long-term (transformational) urban change. The integration of the partnership's methodology into day-today municipal administration makes it less likely for long-term city employees to view operations improvement as the "pet project" of a short-term mayor whose term in office is limited.
Research Setting and Methodology
The research setting for our analysis of the two mayoral-led public-private partnerships focuses on Cleveland in 1979 and in 2006. Our single-city setting is consistent with Mendel and Brudney's (2012) argument that this method controls for contextual differences inside publicprivate partnerships. Given our long view of Cleveland's partnership history, we can differentiate between the short-term and long-term (transformational) impacts of the Voinovich OITF partnership and the Jackson OETF partnership, respectively. In this way, our analysis deepens understanding of how the two public-private partnerships successfully helped the city of Cleveland adapt to a changing environment. 
Activating Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich (1979)
Studying government through public-private partnerships inhered in Mayor Voinovich's work ethic. Steiner (1999) described Voinovich as a calm public servant who applied a thoughtful, analytical, and nonpartisan approach to every challenge. Steiner also observed that Voinovich consistently empowered others to help him set a course of action that was best for making a positive difference in the lives of citizens. Voinovich summarized this leadership philosophy of empowerment as "Together We Can Do It," as follows:
I believe government's highest calling is to empower people and galvanize their energy and resources to help solve our problems, meet our challenges, and seize our opportunities. I also believe it's 6 a leader's role to reach deep into every individual, draw out the goodness that's inside, and inspire people to use that goodness to help themselves, their families, and their communities (Cited in Riffe 1999, 1) .
Moreover, Voinovich combined this leadership philosophy and analytical management approach of operations efficiency with an unwavering commitment to Cleveland.
Voinovich's steadfast conviction to his hometown was evident in his unexpected decision to resign as Ohio Lieutenant Governor and run for the Cleveland mayoralty in 1979. At that time, Cleveland was broke -"in fact and spirit" (deWindt 1981) . Due to the high inflation of the late 1970s, Cleveland's expenditures increased dramatically. The city's spending was exacerbated by its geographic size that was based on one million residents. Given that Cleveland's population fell to 573,822 by 1979, budget shortfalls were inevitable. Instead of addressing these budget and structural issues, the city relied on short-run strategies that included the selling of municipal assets, such as its transportation and sewer systems, to receive one-time revenue and by using federal program funds, such as the LEAA and CBDG, to pay for city operations ).
Moreover, Cleveland residents were suffering due to deplorable living conditions with streets strewn with litter, blighted neighborhoods, racial polarization in the unresponsive police department, and the "countless breakdowns in the machinery of government" (deWindt 1981; Bryan 2014) . According to , Cleveland was in a dire situation.
The Mayor and City Council were at war with each other. The administration was at war with the neighborhoods. It was reported that a key administration official punched a nun. The neighborhood people were at war with the Police Department for a lack of a police response and perceived excessive force. The organization representing black policemen was suing the city for racial discrimination in the department. The city was up in arms over schooling busing and a federal judge that mishandled it. Neighborhoods devastated from the riots of the late 60s [had approximately] 5,000 properties that were in need of immediate demolition. The city-owned electric company became a public football in spite of being on the verge of collapse. Unemployment was about 18%, and the city had a real hunger crisis.
Furthermore, Mayor Dennis Kucinich rejected attempts by the business community to help him address these problems. Instead, he declared war on Cleveland's corporate leaders, publicly denouncing them in national arenas as "fat cats" who wanted to dictate to the "little people" (deWindt 1981; Vogelsang-Coombs, 2007) . The combination of the city's financial instability, its political infighting, and Kucinich's divisive administrative style sparked a special election to recall the mayor. Although Mayor Kucinich narrowly survived the recall, he was unable to secure credit from the Cleveland bankers when $14 million in short-term municipal loans came due. In particular, the business community wanted Kucinich to privatize the city's municipal utility (known as Muny Light). Kucinich's refusal to sell Muny Light prompted the Cleveland Trust to demand repayment of its loans, forcing the city to default in 1978.
After the national disgrace of Cleveland's default, E.M. deWindt, the Chairman of the Eaton Corporation, organized an intense corporate effort to recruit Lt. Governor Voinovich to run for mayor. To help Voinovich reverse the city's dire direction, de Windt (1981) pledged that he would secure corporate funding to underwrite and provide the human capital necessary for establishing a public-private partnership aimed at improving the operations of Cleveland. Given this pledge, Voinovich shelved his gubernatorial ambition because he realized, he could "do more as mayor . . . and because of the dire situation it could be the most significant contribution
[he] could make in [his] career in government" ). Voinovich's vision for a public-private partnership centered on operations improvement convinced the city's corporate leaders that:
Cleveland would give birth to a rare animal: a task force that would result in action rather than rhetoric. Like most big cities, Cleveland had been studied to near death. In recent years, five separate studies, including a Little Hoover Commission, focused on Cleveland. Each study ended up with a thick, spiral-bound tome and precious little action. We had had enough pretty pictures and multicolored charts. This time there had to be action . . . and plenty of it (deWindt 1981).
In November 1979, Voinovich, a Republican, decisively defeated Mayor Kucinich, a Democrat, by receiving 56% of the votes cast in solidly blue Cleveland.
One day after his election, Voinovich went to work with deWindt to develop the OITF public-private partnership. Within three weeks of Voinovich's election, deWindt had the OITF's governing structure in place (see Table 2 ). At the top was a twelve-member Executive
Committee that acted as a board of directors, setting the policy objectives and providing the financial and personnel resources for the OITF. As shown in Table 2 One day after his inauguration Mayor Voinovich sought to determine the true financial condition of the city. A state audit revealed that the city's accounting records were "unauditable" . Therefore, the Ohio General Assembly placed Cleveland under the fiscal supervision of the state's Financial Planning Commission in January 1980. Consequently, the mayor established the Volunteer Financial Audit Task Force comprised primarily of accountants from the big-eight firms. The auditors found that the city was $110 million in debt. In effect, Cleveland's financial position was much bleaker than Voinovich expected. Thus, negotiating a debt repayment plan, restoring the city's positive credit rating, and ending the state's supervision of Cleveland's finances were the mayor's fiscal objectives folded into the scope of the Voinovich OITF public-private partnership.
The external champion of the OITF partnership was deWindt, and under his leadership, the Executive Committee raised $794,000, including challenge grants of $150,000 and $100,000 from the Cleveland Foundation and Gund Foundation, respectively. Additionally, deWindt and Morton Mandel, a prominent Cleveland entrepreneur and philanthropist serving on the Ways and Means Committee, generated widespread community support that resulted in $544,000 in additional funds for the operation of the Voinovich OITF partnership. Specifically, 264 private firms (88%) and 36 not-for-profit organizations (12%) in Greater Cleveland served as sponsors of the OITF partnership. Among the OITF sponsors were eight (8) labor unions (OITF 1982) .
Our interviews revealed that the internal champion of the Voinovich OITF partnership was Council President George Forbes. Shortly after assuming office, Mayor Voinovich met with the Council President to persuade him that his OITF partnership agenda was aimed at making Cleveland a better place for everyone everywhere in the city to live. According to Voinovich (2014) , the Council President was impressed that the Greater Cleveland Roundtable supported the mayor's OITF partnership agenda. By securing the support of the Roundtable, the OITF partnership tapped into "our United Nations that dealt with jobs, economic development, and education, labor, and race relations" because "its membership included CEOs, elected officials, religious leaders, union officials, neighborhood activists, and the leaders of the AfricanAmerican, Hispanic, and ethnic communities" . It is important to note that the The Ways and Means Committee successfully recruited 89 loaned executives for twelve weeks of OITF duty. These volunteers included "lawyers, accountants, administrators; CEOs, and CFOs; engineers experts in computers and human relations and every management discipline" (deWindt 1981). Four study teams of business volunteers were formed to study the 63 agencies within the city, and the chair of each team was a member of the Operating Committee. [Endnote 3] In effect, every city department and administrative process was within the OITF partnership's purview. Before the loaned executives were embedded in the study teams, WKA trained them about the differences between the public and private sectors, reminded them their purpose was to share best practices respectfully with city employees, and praised them for their willingness to help their hometown (Bryan 2014).
Framing Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich (1980)
The stated goal of the Voinovich OITF partnership was: "To help improve the quality of life for the people of Cleveland by making local government more responsive to citizen needs."
To frame the work of the OITF study teams, the Executive Committee set the following objectives: (1) identify immediate opportunities for increasing efficiency and improving cost effectiveness that could be realized by executive or administrative order; (2) suggest managerial, operating and organizational improvements for immediate and long-term consideration by the Mayor and City Council; and (3) pinpoint specific areas where further in-depth analysis could be justified by potential short or long-term benefit (OITF 1982) . Mayor Voinovich's unwavering commitment to the OITF partnership set a positive tone throughout the city and framed his larger focus on the primacy of professional management.
However, when Voinovich assumed office, city hall operations were chaotic, and staff morale was low (Bryan 2014). As a group, the city commissioners (the highest civil service ranking employees) felt broken, and the rank-and-file employees were afraid that "heads would roll" based on what the loaned executives would do (Interviews 2014).
Within three weeks of taking office, Mayor Voinovich sent a memo to reassure city managers and build their support for the OITF study process. Specifically, he asked all department directors and city commissioners to provide an itemized list of the status of service in their units, using a rating scale of "inadequate," "adequate," and "more than adequate" service.
The mayor also encouraged them to share their thoughts about how to organize their departments to function better and more efficiently. Their responses were fed back to the OITF study teams and ultimately became a part of the OITF partnership's change proposals. Voinovich believed this employee-centered process helped him gain the management staff's confidence in the partnership's goal of operations improvement.
To build staff morale, Mayor Voinovich established a culture of professional management at city hall. One way he did this was to remove the patronage politics that pervaded city administration. In particular, he eliminated the requirement for city employees to kick back a portion of their salary by buying or selling tickets for mayoral campaign fund-raisers. Mayor Voinovich made it clear to all city employees that he would base their evaluations on their job performance rather than on the number of campaign tickets they sold or on their personal relationships with the mayor (Voinovich 2014) .
13
Another way Mayor Voinovich professionalized the culture was by his involving city employees in the OITF study process. In framing the OITF, he approached them to find out what they were doing right by soliciting their ideas about what they could do better. The message he sent was "how can we help you do your job better, smarter, and in the most cost-effective way?" (Voinovich 2014 ). In addition, the OITF Implementation Coordinator met regularly with every city commissioner, thereby tapping into their expertise and institutional knowledge of the sixtythree operating units. Without this employee-centered process to frame the OITF Partnership, Voinovich believed that improving the city's operations would not have been possible (Voinovich 2014) .
Synthesizing Behavior of Mayor Voinovich (1980-82)
Unlike the strife characterizing Mayor Kucinich's relationship to the City Council, Mayor Voinovich restored civility between Cleveland's executive and legislative branches. Moreover, the Council President as the internal OITF partnership champion was a true ally of the mayor because privately he built the political majority necessary to enact the OITF change proposals.
Eventually, the council passed sixty OITF-related ordinances that focused on operations, management, and service delivery.
Within ninety days of its inception, the OITF Partnership delivered a comprehensive evaluation of Cleveland's city government. This report had 650 workable recommendations, each of which was vetted and edited by the Operating Committee. Afterwards, Mayor Voinovich required his department directors to develop implementation plans for their units, and he evaluated their performance heavily in terms of their progress. The mayor also met weekly with the Operating Committee and the OITF Implementation Coordinator, whose sole responsibility was to track and facilitate the progress made in carrying out the improvement recommendations (Bryan 2014). Once a month, the mayor devoted time at his cabinet meeting for the department heads to report to their peers their progress in implementing their OITF action plans. Informally, Mayor Voinovich conferred "eagle" and "jackass" awards to those department heads that made an outstanding or a limited effort, respectively, in carrying out their OITF commitments (Voinovich 2014) . The leadership and direct engagement of Mayor Voinovich in synthesizing the OITF implementation activities was vital to the partnership's success.
Overall, 94% of the OITF recommendations were implemented that reduced the city workforce by 4% and saved $200 million collectively (OITF 1982) . Additionally, Mayor Voinovich reorganized ten departments, instituted an accounting system with internal auditing capabilities, and achieved savings of $57 million annually. He also set controls on police overtime and adopted a computerized communication system to speed up the response time of safety forces, streamlined purchasing transactions, instituted a city-wide vehicle control and maintenance system, revamped the snow removal process, upgraded data processing capabilities, and improved personnel procedures (deWindt 1981; OITF 1982) . By the end of 1981, Cleveland was no longer in default, and the city achieved an investment grade for its credit rating; fiscal control was returned to the city when the state's supervisory commission disbanded in June 1987.
At its conclusion in March 1982, the leadership of the OITF partnership delivered a second report to Mayor Voinovich. This report directed the mayor's attention to the needed middle-and long-term strategies for the professional management of Cleveland's finances and service delivery. Based on this report, Mayor Voinovich and the OITF Executive Committee identified fourteen major improvement projects, including an enhanced computer-aided dispatch system for the police department; a wage and salary administration study; a building maintenance system; EEO program assistance; a fire location study; and a payroll system (Bryan 2014). The mayor used 66 percent of the funds raised by the OITF public-private partnership (or $596,000) to cover the cost of implementing these fourteen projects (see Exhibit III, OITF 1982 ).
An important synthesizing feature of the Voinovich OITF partnership was that it fostered professional relationships between the loaned private sector executives and their city counterparts. As deWindt (1981) noted the OITF recommendations were integrated into city operations for two reasons. The first reason is that city employees embraced the OITF study process because they participated in making the decisions about what to change in their own work settings. The second reason is that the loaned executives found that most city employees were dedicated, hard-working, and willing to go beyond the call of duty, despite laboring under inefficient practices, untrained managers, inadequate resources, outdated equipment, and faulty technology.
Overall, the Cleveland business community became fully invested in Mayor Voinovich's OITF partnership to restore good government in the city (Interviews 2014). The leadership of the OITF public-private partnership reported that Cleveland:
. . . expanded vital channels of communication between the public and private sectors. Without the cooperation of the city's employees, the progress achieved would not have been possible. In addition, task force members have developed a better understanding of the complex problems of municipal government management through their work with agency officials (OITF 1982) .
In fact, many loaned executives stayed involved with their city counterparts on their own time long after the study period ended, and some loaned executives joined the city's work force (Bryan 2014) . Strategically, the mayor expanded these channels of communication between the public and private sectors to sustain the results of the OITF partnership.
Sustaining Behaviors of Mayor Voinovich (1982-89)
Mayor Voinovich in partnership with Council President Forbes institutionalized the OITF's legacy. In 1981, the Council voted to place two OITF-inspired charter amendments on the ballot. One amendment lengthened the terms of the mayor and council members from two to four years in addition to strengthening the mayor's executive powers; the other amendment clarified the prevailing wage requirements for city workers. Both charter changes were approved by the voters. The voters also approved an earnings tax earmarked for debt repayment and capital improvements (Vogelsang-Coombs 2007).
To sustain the work of the OITF partnership internally, Mayor Voinovich, assisted by philanthropist Morton Mandel, created Project MOVE -the Mayor's Operation Volunteer Effort. Overall, Project MOVE channeled 8,000 volunteer business and community leaders into most levels of all city departments (Garda, n.d.) . To recognize the contributions of the volunteers, Voinovich established the Mayor's Award for Volunteerism and designated "a wall of fame" in Cleveland city hall, where plaques still hang to honor the MOVE volunteers (Voinovich 2014) .
Much has been written about the immediate outcomes of the OITF partnership, so we will only present some highlights. As a result of the OITF, the city secured $149 million in Urban Development Action Grants that leveraged $770 million in private investments, including projects for neighborhood revitalization (Mendel & Brudney 2012) Pundits described Frank Jackson's character as "honest" and "contemplative," a selfeffacing politician without "ego or ambition" (Roberts 2012, 11) . His council colleagues perceived him as a man of high integrity, an exceptionally good listener, and an excellent reader of people (Westbrook 2014). Jackson described himself as a "servant-leader" with a social equity mission to make a difference in the lives of citizens, especially "for those among us who have the least." In his view, government was different from the private sector. Although government, he said, benefitted by applying business-oriented efficiency practices in its operations, its bottom line was quality service to people (Jackson 2014 remained headquartered in the city, Cleveland's steel mills were closed, and local manufacturing companies were struggling. Given that city employees lacked up-to-date hardware, software, and basic computer training, the city's operations were inefficient because few administrative processes were automated. Labor relations were tense because of the layoffs done under the Campbell administration, and the staff downsizing disrupted service delivery to residents.
As the newly elected mayor, Jackson inherited a deficit of $30 million from his predecessor. Nevertheless, Jackson refused to sell city assets or use one-time revenues sources to balance the city's budget. For him, good government meant that Cleveland operated efficiently within its tax and revenue base. Thus, the overarching purpose of Mayor Jackson's publicprivate partnership was to eliminate the city's recurring budget shortfalls and restore its financial stability while rightsizing Cleveland's government and maintaining quality essential city services (Jackson 2014) . Furthermore, the OETF partnership served as the platform from which Mayor Jackson launched his vision of securing a positive future for Clevelanders in addition to making Cleveland a great city again.
Before launching his public-private partnership, Mayor Jackson consulted with Tom
Wagner, the law director who supervised Mayor Voinovich's OITF partnership. In the end, Jackson chose not to adopt a cookie-cutter approach to activate his OETF partnership because Cleveland's environment had changed substantially from the time of Mayor Voinovich.
Moreover, he was firm that his OETF partnership's approach to operations efficiency would be driven by government and public sector values (Jackson 2014) . Thus, he created the OETF partnership as a broad-based coalition, drawing members from government, business, academia, nonprofit organizations, state and local officials, and former cabinet officials (OETF 2006) . In effect, the mayor structured the OETF partnership to fit Cleveland as he found the city in 2006 and his own leadership style.
Within a month of taking office, Jackson activated the Operations Efficiency Task Force (OETF). At the top of the OETF partnership was the Operations Efficiency Council (see Table   4 ). This Council set the partnership's strategic direction in addition to serving as the oversight body. The council's chair was the city's chief operating officer (COO) Darnell Brown. Besides him, seven volunteers, the city's chief technology officer, and three mayoral assistants served on the Operations Efficiency Council. The seven volunteers were prominent community and business leaders, information technology experts, and leadership experts from Cleveland State University.
<<Table 4 about here>>>
It is important to note that an active member of the Operations Efficiency Council was Jay Westbrook, a highly respected councilman and a former council president. The Westbrook appointment insured that the city council had significant input into the OETF partnership process and up-to-date knowledge of Cleveland's financial condition. This financial transparency led to the city council's willingness to support the changes emerging from the Jackson OETF partnership with legislation (Westbrook 2014; Sweeney 2014).
Similarly, the city's labor unions became the strategic allies of Mayor Jackson. In March 2006, the mayor briefed the union leadership about his employee-centered operation efficiency plans in light of the city's bleak fiscal condition and unfavorable financial forecasts. Boldly, Jackson asked the labor leaders for temporary contract concessions so that he could balance the city's budget without disrupting service to the residents. Furthermore, the mayor pledged that if the unions made concessions to help him achieve a budget in structural balance, then he would maintain the city's employment levels and not lay off staff. All but one union leader agreed, and the roll backs in the labor contracts immediately saved the city $30 million (Jackson 2014 ).
Mayor Jackson succeeded in gaining labor's cooperation for his OETF partnership because the union leaders trusted him and believed in his integrity.
As shown in Table 4 , the OETF partnership had a Communications Advisory Team whose membership included public relations professionals from business, government, and the media as well as mayoral assistants and the city's press secretary. This team was responsible for keeping stakeholders and the public informed about the work of the Jackson OETF partnership.
Mobilizing Activities of Mayor Jackson (2006)
Although Mayor Jackson was the executive sponsor of the OETF partnership, the overall partnership champion was COO Brown. Under Brown's leadership, the Operations Efficiency
Council recruited approximately 406 volunteers from the Greater Cleveland Partnership (the regional business chamber) and its affiliate, the Cleveland Leadership Center, as well as alumni of Cleveland State University's MPA Program and Local Officials Leadership Academy (see Table 5 ). These volunteers contributed more than 12,000 hours of service worth approximately 
Framing Activities of Mayor Jackson (2006-2007)
In April 2006, Mayor Jackson held his first meeting with all OETF volunteers and participating city employees, where he unveiled the charter of his public-private partnership (see Figure 1 ). This charter established the OETF partnership's urgent good (efficient) government purpose. Additionally, the charter expressed the OETF partnership's guiding principles that included Mayor Jackson's commitments to value the expertise of employees, give them with opportunities for retraining, and enable them to share their learning. Besides clarifying the roles and responsibilities of OETF participants, the charter cited thirteen critical success factors, including the elimination of service gaps across city departments, the use of innovative solutions in service delivery, and the utilization of technology to enhance data collection and guide decision making. Thus, the public-private partnership charter framed the mayor's plans to foster a citywide culture of excellent performance and customer service.
<<Insert Figure 1 Also, as a part of the framing process, Mayor Jackson informed his cabinet directors that he expected them to live within their budgets. Accordingly, he ended the practice of padding one department's budget to pay for cost overruns generated in another department. He also informed his directors that the cost savings generated by their departments and divisions would be redistributed to those city operations where they would produce the greatest efficiencies, customer service improvements, and productivity gains (Jackson 2014) .
Specifically, the work of the OETF partnership was divided into two phases: eight Action Teams operated in Phase 1 (2006 Phase 1 ( -2007 , and sixteen Action Teams in Phase 2 (2007 Phase 2 ( -2008 Taken as a group, the OETF Action Teams covered all aspects of city operations except public safety. [Endnote 6] To build the capacity of the Action Team members, the staff from the OETF Project Management Office (PMO) organized technical, leadership, customer service and performance measurement training programs for the partnership volunteers and the city employees to participate together at the beginning of their OETF assignments. Given their common training experience, city employees felt comfortable in opening their units up to the outsiders on their Action Teams. These training sessions also built camaraderie among the city employees who worked in different departments and fostered good will between the city employees and the outside experts.
Each Action Team was co-chaired by a department director and a volunteer expert (called the external lead). The Action Teams were given the following four objectives: (1) to reduce operating costs by at least 3%; (2) to enhance city services by using performance indicators and targets; (3) to increase employee productivity through better use of technology; and (4) improve customer service to internal and external customers (OETF 2006 (OETF & 2007 . The Action Teams applied the PMO's performance methodology by assessing the current or "as is," work process for their assigned department or citywide service. After mapping these work processes, the Action Teams proposed recommendations that contained performance targets and customer service standards designed to achieve the four OETF objectives. Overall, the Action Teams produced 394 recommendations for improving more than 100 city processes operations from the inside out (OETF 2007).
Based on their success in producing workable improvement recommendations, city employees developed an identity as the internal champions of operations efficiency. Because 26 these employee-participants were scattered throughout Cleveland's sixty departments and divisions, their work on the OETF Action Teams informally facilitated a shift in the city's work culture. This shift to a citywide culture of excellent performance and customer service occurred without an incident because it was driven by the bottom-up, employee-centered approach of the Jackson OETF partnership.
Synthesizing Behaviors of Mayor Jackson (2007-08)
Mayor Jackson delegated the day-to-day supervision of the OETF Action Teams to COO Brown. However, if department heads were not meeting their OETF expectations, then the mayor would forcefully "get into their business," demanding to know when and how they would change their lackluster performance. In fact, the mayor removed one intransigent division head that blocked the implementation of the OETF recommendations at the city. In effect, he made it clear that the implementation of the OETF partnership recommendations was a priority, and he was serious about seeing results (Jackson 2014) . COO Brown and PMO manager Whitlow combined data-driven decision-making and management by walking around. In particular, the PMO staff developed performance dashboards built on the performance targets identified in the OETF recommendations, collected and tracked performance measurements, and reported the results to the Action Teams. Additionally, the COO and the PMO staff met with the Action Teams, including the community volunteers and line employees, in the city's departments and divisions. This practice gave line employees an opportunity to engage with top city officials about their operational needs and aspirations. OETF partnership improved the quality of life for citizens, including more timely snow removal, street repair, and waste collection, and more frequent sweeping of residential streets. The city also instituted a recycling program. With no new additional resources, Mayor Jackson reopened the city's neighborhood-based recreation centers that were closed under previous mayors due to tight budgets. As a result of the OETF improvements, the recreation centers extended their hours to Saturdays, and the city added a new recreation center.
The Jackson OETF partnership facilitated opportunities for employees to develop a citywide perspective. In Phase 1 of the OETF partnership, the city established the Strategic Information Technology Council. This council had the oversight of the deployment and utilization of IT systems across the departments to insure the city's technology aligned with the OETF partnership's strategic goals. As a result, the city adopted web-enabled interactive portals for citizen access, established a system of e-permitting, and provided field personnel with handheld computers that had direct access to their operational systems. In 2008, the city launched a "3-1-1" communication system that allowed residents to report and receive faster service in nonemergency situations.
In addition, the city established two noteworthy cross-departmental initiatives to serve older and younger residents. The Senior Initiative involved six departments that helped older residents (persons aged 60 and over) upgrade their homes to meet housing codes. The youth initiative, called "One Voice, Zero Tolerance," involved staff from three departments and the mayor's office; together they developed a package of education, prevention, intervention, and workforce training services. Both initiatives were still working in 2014.
Finally, the Jackson OETF partnership process extended the cooperation between the city of Cleveland and suburban jurisdictions. As a result of some OETF recommendations, the city established agreements with contiguous jurisdictions related to overlapping functions, such as snow removal and street repair. Mayor Jackson also worked with the Cuyahoga County Mayors and Managers Association to develop joint economic agreements tied to Cleveland water service, in which participating cities shared taxes from relocating industries (Jackson 2009 ).
Sustaining Behaviors of Mayor Jackson (2009-2014)
One way Mayor Jackson sustained the OETF improvements internally was by investing in CitiStat, a data-driven work management system developed in Baltimore. In 2011, the city merged the CitiStat and "3-1-1" systems to create a citywide performance dashboard. This enhanced dashboard gave employees up-to-date data on their response time to citizen complaints, while department directors gained information about under-served areas of the city. The general public had access to these performance data because the city published the citywide performance dashboard in the Mayor's Annual Report to the citizenry (Whitlow 2014).
Another way the city sustained the OETF efficiency and productivity gains was by making staff training and development mayoral priorities. Cross-functional training, mobility assignments, and internships were used to develop in-house talent and helped establish career paths for city employees. In a partnership with Cleveland State University and the Cleveland Foundation, the city established the Cleveland Management Academy (CMA) in 2009. Specifically, the CMA was a year-long management development program aligned with the objectives of the Jackson OETF partnership (Starzyk, 2009 ). Mayor Jackson (2014 reported that he promoted eight CMA graduates into positions of department directors and city commissioners (without knowing they were CMA alumni) because they were the best candidates. Thus, the A mayor from Cleveland's poorest neighborhoods is presiding over a downtown population boom, and a surge of vitality is attracting young professionals to the city's near West Side. Jackson helped those changes along with reliable services, a rejuvenated economic development department, strategic spending at key moments, and the more tangible aspects of his sustainability effort, from bike lanes to support of the local food movement. After the employees and the volunteers merged ideas and improvement recommendations, they co-designed performance measures. This process contributed to employee ownership for the implementation of the partnership's change proposals. It also led to creativity, innovation, and sustained improvements in city operations.
The third lesson focuses on the effects of participation in the Voinovich and Jackson public-private partnerships. Feedback from city employees revealed how much they gained from the perspective of the volunteers; the volunteers reported they had a "newfound respect" for the professionalism and competence of city employees. For city employees, in particular, their participation in the mayoral public-private partnerships served a liberating experience. These "liberated" employees became the advocates of professional management at city hall and informally created a city-wide network of internal change agents. This network of internal employee-change agents seamlessly engineered the professionalization of the city's work culture from the bottom up. For the outside volunteers, their participation in the mayoral public-private partnerships had an educative effect. The volunteers were impressed by the dedication and competence of city employees from whom they learned how Cleveland's government really works, and many developed permanent friendships with their city counterparts. Through this educational experience, the volunteers deepened their affiliation with the city of Cleveland.
Three governance implications emerge from these lessons. The first implication is that a public-private partnership oriented toward operations efficiency is not just for a newly elected mayor facing a crisis. Both Mayors Voinovich and Jackson advocated using a public-private partnership oriented toward operations efficiency on a regular basis. Mayor Voinovich (2014) felt that Cleveland would benefit by renewing a public-private partnership oriented toward operations efficiency every six years because "people get stale and their good habits disappear." Similarly, Mayor Jackson (2014) felt that the implementation of another OETF partnership would keep people from "going back to their old ways" because "someone was watching." Apart from the Hawthorne effect, a public-private partnership oriented toward operations efficiency can alert a mayor to data processing problems and to the availability of new technology and software to drive performance decisions. Thus, a public-private partnership can help a city avoid getting dangerously behind on automation. Also, the cross-departmental relationships fostered in a public-private partnership can help a mayor develop a comprehensive approach to service delivery rather than to rely on a complaint-driven system that fragments administrative responses.
The second implication concerns the timing of a mayoral-led public-private partnership.
The implementation of a public-private partnership is easier politically for newly elected mayors than for incumbent mayors. Incumbent mayors may be reluctant to implement a needed publicprivate partnership because they may not want to give the voters the impression that their administrations are unstable. The perception of an unstable administration could erode their chances for reelection. Thus, incumbent mayors should tailor their public-private partnership to address a few priority issues, as Mayor Voinovich did in his follow-up to the OITF partnership.
The third implication concerns citizen participation. Neither the Voinovich OITF partnership nor the Jackson OETF partnership incorporated lay citizens. The tendency in a mayoral-led public-private partnership is to recruit outsiders who can bring specific expertise to advise city employees. However, there is value for a mayor to work with council members to include lay citizens in a public-private partnership oriented toward operations improvement because lay citizens are the true barometers of service quality. As partnership members, lay citizens can assess the status of service delivery in their neighborhoods, contribute to the design of a public-private partnership's change proposals, and evaluate service delivery improvements, all from the perspective of the end users.
Conclusion
This research paper analyzed the good government characteristics of the public-private partnerships led by Mayor Voinovich and Mayor Jackson in Cleveland. Our research method applied and extended the network theory of McGuire and Agranoff. We evaluated the Voinovich and Jackson partnerships against the backdrop of five network (partnership) behaviors of activating, mobilizing, framing, synthesizing, and sustaining. These behaviors were general categories that not only provided a complete inside picture of both mayoral-led partnerships but enabled the discernment of their short-and long-term (transformational) results. The sustained effects of the Voinovich OITF public-private partnership transformed Cleveland into the "comeback city" after the 1978 municipal default. The sustained effects of the Jackson OETF public-private partnership positioned Cleveland as the "city of choice" in 2014. In effect, both mayoral-led public-private partnerships quietly transformed Cleveland's government to meet the demands of fewer resources, greater complexity, more transparency, and more timely decisions in the delivery of public services to citizens.
Finally, it is important to note that no algorithm existed for designing a mayoral-led public private partnership, even in the single setting of Cleveland. Consequently, the five network (partnership) behaviors can guide a mayor in adapting a public-private partnership to fit his or her leadership style, the environment of urban governance, and the urgent needs of citizens. Furthermore, the findings from our application of network theory may serve as propositions for future researchers to test. Empirical testing will deepen knowledge about the transformational effects of a mayoral-led public-private partnership in municipal governance.
Endnotes
underachieving public school had access to high-quality options available for their children's education. Then, in 2012, the mayor mobilized a bipartisan coalition comprising prominent business and community leaders, teachers' unions, teachers, parents, as well as key state and county officials that secured legislation and a tax levy to sustain the innovative Cleveland Plan (O'Donnell & Guillen 2012; Trickey 2013). 
